The effect of one-on-one assistance on the compliance with labor regulation. A field experiment in extremely vulnerable settings

José María Cabrera, Alejandro Cid () and Marianne Bernatzky Bernatzky

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This is the first paper to analyze the effects of intense personal assistance on the compliance with labor regulation, within a population of deeply disadvantaged informal workers, using a field experiment. We randomly assign one-on-one assistance to these workers, and, within this treatment group, we randomly assign money to cover the cost of fulfilling the legal requirements to get a permit to work on the streets. One month after the intervention, we find that a worker who receives one-on-one assistance is three times more likely to comply with the legal documentation required by the government than a worker in the control group. We also find that a worker who receives both one-on-one assistance and cost coverage is four times more likely to comply with the legal requirements. The findings of this study shed light on strategies to help highly vulnerable workers to comply with labor regulations.

Keywords: case management; one-on-one assistance; randomized control trial; field experiment; labor regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D04 D46 I30 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-iue and nep-lam
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The effect of one-on-one assistance on the compliance with labor regulation. A field experiment in extremely vulnerable settings (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:84639

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