A new irrelevance result in an endogenous timing with a consumer-friendly public firm
Mariel Leal and
Sang-Ho Lee ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This study considers a mixed duopoly with a consumer-friendly public firm and analyzes an endogenous timing game in the presence of output subsidy and emission tax. We provide a new irrelevance result concerning the choice of government policy in which regardless of the policy mix, the equilibrium of endogenous market structure is determined by the public firm’s concern on consumer surplus. We also show that the optimal policy mix can attain the first-best allocation for social welfare only when both firms have symmetric payoffs, which results in simultaneous-move outcome.
Keywords: Keywords: irrelevance result; endogenous timing game; consumer-friendly public firm; emission tax; output subsidy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:85648
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