Unequal exchange: developing countries in the international trade negotiations

Julio Nogues ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The results of the Uruguay Round, show that the concessions given by developing countries were generally more valuable than those they received from industrial countries. I suggest that this outcome is explained by aggressive demands from industrial countries, and by the lack of resources at the disposal of developing countries. These and other ‘structural factors’ weaken the negotiating capacity of developing countries and the outcome of their bargaining is likely to be an ‘unequal exchange of concessions’. The chapter discusses the costs of these exchanges, and the structural factors that help to understand the processes leading to these outcomes.

Keywords: Multilateral trade negotiations; exchange of concessions; developing countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 F6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Published in The political economy of policy reform (Douglas Nelson ed.) (2004): pp. 295-327

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:86172

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