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Reciprocity Reciprocity in Climate Coalition Formationin Climate Coalition Formation

Yu-Hsuan Lin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study investigates the impact of reciprocal altruistic attitudes on individual willingness to participate in a climate coalition with experimental evidences. The theoretical result suggested that the scope of the coalition’s formation could be enlarged by the participation of altruists. However, we found that a kind participant in the altruism test could behave unkindly to others in the public good game. Considering attitudes against reciprocal altruism, when participants thought they were being treated badly, they were more likely to join a coalition because of the threat of punishment. In contrast, when participants were noncritical to a coalition, such altruistic attitudes were insignificant to their decisions. This result implies that decisions in international conventions are not self-enforced. Overall, this study reveals that self-interest remains the key factor influencing individual participation in climate coalitions. Coalition formation can also be affected by reciprocal altruistic preferences.

Keywords: social preference; experimental design; reciprocity; altruism; international environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86494/1/MPRA_paper_86494.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88045/8/MPRA_paper_88045.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:86494

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