Conditions institutionnelles de la malédiction des ressources naturelles en Afrique sur les performances économiques
Institutional conditions of the natural resource curse in Africa on economic performance
Tcheta-Bampa, Albert and
Oasis Kodila-Tedika ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We show that if Africa is subject to the curse of natural resources it is because this continent has generally been organized since the European colonization on the basis of extractive institutions that determines the strong conflicts between the economic preferences of the political decision-makers and those of the rest of society. In particular, we show that the quality of institutions in African countries is fundamentally determined by historical factors. The main originality is that it uses as an instrumental variable, the institutional path dependence that ensures that there is a curse of natural resources only in countries where the extractive institutions of colonialism have been reproduced. We provide evidence that the overall impact of institutions and natural resource dependence on economic performance is critically dependent on past events as these determine the incentive structure and future institutional choices. The phenomenon of the curse is decreasing in Africa as we move away from the end of the Cold War.
Keywords: Colonialisme européen; institutions; ressources naturelles; malédiction des ressources; droits de propriété; Indépendance; croissance économique. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B2 B22 C12 O1 O17 O55 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86511/1/MPRA_paper_86511.pdf original version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:86511
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().