Three-sided matchings and separable preferences

Somdeb Lahiri

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.

JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8660/1/MPRA_paper_8660.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8867/1/MPRA_paper_8867.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8890/1/MPRA_paper_8890.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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