Cream Skimming and Information Design in Marching Markets

Gleb Romanyuk and Alex Smolin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and sequentially decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information disclosure leads to a market failure because of excessive rejections by the sellers. If sellers are homogeneous, then coarse information policies are able to restore efficiency. If sellers are heterogeneous, then simple censorship policies are often constrained efficient as shown by a novel method of calculus of variations.

Keywords: cream skimming; matching markets; market failure; information design; calculus of variations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86713/1/MPRA_paper_86713.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88244/1/MPRA_paper_86713.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:86713

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