Monotone Global Games
Eric Hoffmann and
Tarun Sabarwal ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We extend the global games method to finite player, finite action, monotone games. These games include games with strategic complements, games with strategic substitutes, and arbitrary combinations of the two. Our result is based on common order properties present in both strategic complements and substitutes, the notion of p-dominance, and the use of dominance solvability as the solution concept. In addition to being closer to the original arguments in Carlsson and van Damme (1993), our approach requires fewer additional assumptions. In particular, we require only one dominance region, and no assumptions on state monotonicity, or aggregative structure, or overlapping dominance regions. As expected, the p-dominance condition becomes more restrictive as the number of players increases. In cases where the probabilistic burden in belief formation may be reduced, the p-dominance condition may be relaxed as well. We present some examples that are not covered by existing results.
Keywords: Global games; strategic complements; strategic substitutes; monotone games; equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86943/1/MPRA_paper_86942.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88687/1/MPRA_paper_86942.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88688/4/MPRA_paper_88688.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91258/11/MPRA_paper_91258.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Monotone Global Games (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:86943
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().