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Anticorruption National System: Model Whistleblowers Direct Citizen Action Against Corruption in Mexico

Carlos Medel-Ramírez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The phenomenon of corruption is a cancer that affects our country and that it is necessary to eradicate; This dilutes the opportunities for economic and social development, privileging the single conjunction of particular interests, political actors in non-legal agreements for their own benefit, which lead to acts of corruption. Recent studies indicate that the level of corruption present in a political system is directly related to the type of institutional structure that defines it (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009), as well as the ineffectiveness of the control organisms (Casar, 2015; Cárdenas, 2010, Rojas, 2010, Carbonell, 2009, Restrepo, 2004), which requires citizen action to combat corruption (Sandoval, 2010, Villanueva, 2006). This work, focuses our attention on the federal public administration, presenting as a proposal to empower the citizen action in the fight against corruption and in the National Anticorruption System; the figure of Whistleblowers or generator of citizen alert, based on two fundamental principles: i) recognizing the citizen's obligation to report acts of corruption and ii) the granting by the authority of witness protection. These two actions will result in two important results: i) Consolidate the citizen's complaint to inform society about acts of corruption and ii) and the exercise of freedom of information so that society is able to be informed about acts of corruption. These actions will allow promoting and consolidating a culture of reporting acts of corruption that may constitute a crime as a fundamental pillar in the National Anticorruption System in Mexico.

Keywords: Anticorruption; Control of corruption; Perception of corruption; Whistleblowers; National Anticorruption System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04-10, Revised 2018-05-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
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Published in Public choice: Analysis of collective decision-making E-journal 54.11(2018): pp. 1-12

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