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Endogenous Timing in a Price-Setting Mixed Oligopoly

Junichi Haraguchi and Kosuke Hirose

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate the endogenous order of moves in a price-setting mixed oligopoly model, comprising two private firms and a public firm. We show that sequential moves emerge as the equilibrium in the observable delay game. Specifically, one of the private firms and the public firm set their prices in period 1, and the other private firm does so in period 2, in equilibrium, if their goods are not significantly differentiated. This is a clear contrast to a mixed duopoly where a simultaneous move game is a unique equilibrium. We also discuss a number of extensions and the robustness of our result.

Keywords: Mixed Markets; Endogenous Timing; Stackelberg (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H44 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 2018-06-12
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