EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

On the Choice of R&D Organization

Abhishek Kabiraj and Tarun Kabiraj

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper seeks to examine, in the context of Marjit (1991, Eco. Lett.) and Mukherjee and Marjit (2004, Gr. Dec. Nego.) models, the effect on the choice of R&D organization if the number of research lab is chosen by the firms optimally under R&D cooperation. Given the optimal form of R&D cooperation, the paper further studies the effect of introducing fee licensing under non-cooperative R&D. We show that our results substantially differ from those in the existing literature. The R&D cost, the success probability, and the size of innovation, all these play a crucial role.

Keywords: R&D organization; Cooperative and non-cooperative research; Technology licensing; Cournot competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino and nep-sbm
Date: 2018-04-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87503/1/MPRA_paper_87503.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:87503

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2018-08-24
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:87503