The Market Testing of Power Supply Agreements: Rationale and Design Evolution in the Philippines

Raul Fabella

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We first set out the rationale for the emerging policy of the Competitive Selection Process (CSP) which mandates market testing the Power Supply Agreements (PSA) of Distribution Utilities in the Philippines. It will potentially address several possible market failures such as connected dealings (“sweetheart deals,” in common parlance) with proprietary GENCOS, lack of incentives for DUs to procure at lowest cost, abuse of market power by large GENCOS in certain localities, etc. It will also potentially lighten the regulatory load of the Energy Regulatory Council (ERC) by replacing the burdensome and politically-sensitive accounting method of evaluating PSAs. It may also attract additional generation capacities by new players. Lower generation cost―and finally, lower prices for consumers―is also a possibility, but not guaranteed. We then discuss the evolution of the design of the CSP over the last two years and how the simplest and best modality was finally arrived at.

Keywords: competitive selection; power supply contracts; market failures; outsourcing to market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016, Revised 2016-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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