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Two classes of weighted values for coalition structures with extensions to level structures

Manfred Besner

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we introduce two new classes of weighted values for coalition structures with related extensions to level structures. The values of both classes coincide on given player sets with Harsanyi payoffs and match therefore adapted standard axioms for TU-values which are satisfied by these values. Characterizing elements of the values from the new classes are a new weighted proportionality within components property and a null player out property, but on different reduced games for each class. The values from the first class, we call them weighted Shapley alliance coalition structure values (weighted Shapley alliance levels values), satisfy the null player out property on usual reduced games. By contrast, the values from the second class, named as weighted Shapley collaboration coalition structure values (weighted Shapley collaboration levels values) have this property on new reduced games where a component decomposes in components of lower levels (these are singletons in a coalition structure) if one player of this component is removed from the game. The first class contains the Owen value (Shapley levels value) and the second class includes a new extension of the Shapley value to coalition structures (level structures) as a special case.

Keywords: Cooperative; game; ·; Weighted; Shapley; coalition; structure; values; ·; Weighted; Shapley; levels; values; ·; Weighted; proportionality; within; components; ·; Dividends (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Date: 2018-07-04
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