Internal Conflict, Elite Action, and State Failure: Evidence from China, 1000-1911
Mark Dincecco and
Yuhua Wang
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the long-run dynamics of internal conflict, elite action over privately- versus publicly-provided security, and state development outcomes in China. We construct new county-level data that span nearly one millennium. We find that, traditionally, elites turned away from clans and toward the imperial government for safety in times of internal conflict. After the new globalizing Western influence took hold in the mid-1800s, however, threatening the imperial government's viability, we find that elites turned back toward clans for protection, particularly during the Taiping Rebellion. Finally, we find a positive link between renewed clan activity and the eventual failure of the imperial Qing state. Our analysis provides a new perspective on the political origins of the Great Divergence, by which Europe took off economically, but China fell behind.
Keywords: Violent Conflict; State-Making; Elite Action; Great Divergence; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N45 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:87777
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