Can regional policies shape migration flows?
Ornella Tarola (),
Augusto Cerqua () and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We consider how two groups of regions, which differ in productivity and public good endowments, compete in tax and public goods to attract or reject migrants. In our framework the less productive regions receive public transfers which increase their panoply of public goods. We find that, whenever public transfers are sufficiently high, migration to the less productive regions is observed only in the case when the productivity gap between regions is not extremely wide. We then employ a regression discontinuity design to empirically assess the causal relationship between the reception of large amounts of public funds and migration flows in the EU-15 regions. The theoretical predictions are broadly confirmed as we find a wide expansion in the share of foreign citizens in the highlysubsidized regions, when compared to low-subsidized regions with similar pre-treatment characteristics.
Keywords: migration; fiscal competition; EU Cohesion Policy; regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 F22 H20 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-mig and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87874/1/MPRA_paper_87874.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Can regional policies shape migration flows? (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:87874
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().