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Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values

Manfred Besner

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we present a new class of values for cooperative games with level structure. We use a multi-step proceeding, suggested first in Owen (1977), applied to the weighted Shapley values. Our first axiomatization is an generalisation of the axiomatization given in Gómez-Rúa and Vidal-Puga (2011), itselves an extension of a special case of an axiomatization given in Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) respectively by efficiency and weighted balanced contributions. The second axiomatization is completely new and extends the axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) by weighted standardness for two player games and consistency. As a corollary we obtain a new axiomatization of the Shapley levels value.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Consistency; Level structure; (Weighted) Shapley (levels) value; Weighted balanced contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2018-07-24
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