Wage-Rise Contract and Labour-Managed Cournot Oligopoly with Complementary Goods

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers a quantity-setting oligopoly model with complementary goods where labour-managed firms are allowed to offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The following two stages are considered. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment device. In the second stage, each firm independently chooses and sells its actual output. The paper analyses the equilibrium of the labour-managed oligopoly model.

Keywords: Cournot competition; Labour-managed oligopoly; Wage-rise contract; Complementary goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:88235

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