When Spillovers Enhance R&D Incentives

Rittwik Chatterjee, Srobonti Chattopadhyay and Tarun Kabiraj

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It is commonly believed that spillover reduces R&D incentives of a firm. This happens because of the non-appropriability problem. However, some empirical literature shows the possibility of enhanced R&D incentives under spillovers. While this is explained in the literature under incomplete information, we show that this may hold even under complete information. We show in particular that in a duopoly there are situations when with no spillovers only one firm invests in R&D, but under spillovers both the firms invest. This occurs when there is complementarity in research and the spillover is below a critical level.

Keywords: R&D spillovers; non-appropriability problem; complete information; R&D incentives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ino
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88743/1/Spillovers ... 26D%20incentives.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:88743

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().