Endogenous Comparative Advantage
Andrea Moro and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously acquire skills that are imperfectly observed by firms, who therefore use aggregate country investment as the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational externality interacting with general equilibrium effects on each country’s skill premium. Asymmetric equilibria with comparative advantages exist even when there is a unique equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric, no-trade equilibria may be unstable under free trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade may be Pareto improving even if it leads to an equilibrium with rich and poor countries, with no special advantage to country size.
Keywords: Trade; Specialization; Human Capital; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 F11 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03-01, Revised 2018-03-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:88779
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