Crowding out effect and traders' overreliance on public information in financial markets: a lesson from the lab
Simone Alfarano (),
Camacho-Cuena, Eva and
Andrea Morone ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Eva Camacho Cuena ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this paper, we study experimentally the information aggregation process in a market as a function of the access to different sources of information, namely an imperfect, public and costless signal into a market where the participants have access to costly and imperfect private information. Our results show that the release of public information provokes a crowding out effect on the traders' information demand while it keeps constant market informativeness, but significantly reduces price informativeness. Traders overrely on public information, which has a significant negative impact on the overall market performance. We detect the emergence of the overrelying phenomenon, despite the absence of an explicit incentive to the subjects to coordinate, demonstrating, therefore, that the adverse effects of releasing public information in a financial market are more relevant than generally assumed, based on the results of previous experiments inspired by simple coordination models. Our results pose new questions when a regulatory institution has to decide the appropriate level of transparency of its communication strategy.
Keywords: Experiments; financial markets; private and public information; overrelying; crowding out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D82 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88866/1/MPRA_paper_88866.pdf original version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:88866
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().