Bargaining order in multilateral bargaining with imperfect compliments

Amit Kumar Maurya

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are selling objects which are imperfect compliments for the buyer, we analyse buyer’s preferred bargaining order i.e. whether the buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first or second. For a narrow range of parameters, where players are patient enough and objects exhibit high degree of complimentarity, multiple equilibria exist such that both the bargaining orders are preferred. For rest of the range, which is relatively much larger, buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first.

Keywords: Key words: Multilateral bargaining; Bargaining order; Imperfect compliments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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