Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with leader and follower

Yasuhito Tanaka

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a Stackelberg type dynamic two-players zero-sum game. One of two players is the leader and the other player is the follower. The game is a two-stages game. In the first stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable. In the second stage the follower determines the value of its strategic variable given the value of the leader's strategic variable. On the other hand, in the static game two players simultaneously determine the values of their strategic variable. We will show that Sion's minimax theorem (Sion(1958)) implies that at the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with a leader and a follower the roles of leader and follower are irrelevant to the payoffs of players, and that the Stackelberg equilbria of the dynamic game are equivalent to the equilibrium of the static game.

Keywords: zero-sum game; Stackelberg; dynamic zero-sum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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