A model of delegated project choice

Mark Armstrong and John Vickers

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects are available to the agent. Two frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, and (ii) a dynamic setting in which the agent searches for projects.

Keywords: Delegation; principal-agent; rules; search; merger policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D86 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8963/1/MPRA_paper_8963.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14161/2/MPRA_paper_14161.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Model of Delegated Project Choice (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:8963

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