North Korea: Sanctions, Engagement, and Strategic Reorientation

Marcus Noland

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines the roles that sanctions, and inducements might play in resolving the North Korea problem. It finds that while the “maximum pressure” narrative is plausible, the evidence to substantiate it is thin. Likewise, the North Korean regime is aware of the potentially constraining (or even destabilizing) political implications of cross-border economic integration and has acted to structure engagement in ways to blunt its transformative impact. Maximizing the transformative possibilities of engagement will require conscious planning by North Korea’s partners. Multilateral guidelines and voluntary codes on corporate conduct could be used to anchor this process, but they will only be effective if there is greater political commitment to such norms than has been witnessed to date. Without such commitments, engagement risks enabling North Korea’s doctrine of the parallel development of weapons of mass destruction and the economy.

Keywords: North Korea; sanctions; labor standards; voluntary codes; special economic zones (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 J47 J8 P33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Related works:
Journal Article: North Korea: Sanctions, Engagement and Strategic Reorientation (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:89691

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