EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility and Spillover

Qing Ma and Heng Xu ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates the firms’ incentive of using corporate socially responsible (CSR) innovation as a device in the presence of spillover effect of such innovation. By modelling a two-period environment where a fraction of consumers is altruistic who have higher willingness to pay for the CSR product, we particularly study the firms’ decision on CSR innovation with respect to the spillover effect and the fraction of the altruistic consumers. We find that a large (small) fraction of the altruistic consumers attracts (restricts) both firms to innovate. Moreover, if the leader has only one chance to innovate (i.e., makes decision on innovation in the first period onely), a relatively large fraction could be a credible threat from the follower to the leader of innovation. Furthermore, in the situation where the leader has option of innovating in both periods, there exists a “patient area” in which the leader wishes to delay its innovation and do it with its rival in the second period. By doing so, the leader can weaken the rival’s benefit from being a follower of innovation.

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; Innovation; Spillover; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L21 M14 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sbm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89771/1/MPRA_paper_89771.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98803/1/MPRA_paper_98803.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:89771

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:89771