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Generalising Conflict Networks

Cortes-Corrales, Sebastián and Paul Gorny ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate the behaviour of agents in bilateral contests within arbitrary network structures when valuations and efficiencies are heterogenous. These parameters are interpreted as measures of strength. We provide conditions for when unique, pure strategy equilibria exist. When a player starts attacking one player more strongly, others join in on fighting the victim. Different efficiencies in fighting make players fight those of similar strength. Centrality of a player (having more enemies) makes a player weaker and her opponents are more likely to attack with more effort.

Keywords: Contest; conflict; networks; games on networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
Date: 2018-11-13
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:90001

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