On the political economy of income taxation
Marcus Berliant () and
Miguel Gouveia ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
The literatures dealing with voting, optimal income taxation, implementation, and pure public goods are integrated here to address the problem of voting over income taxes and public goods. In contrast with previous articles, general nonlinear income taxes that affect the labor-leisure decisions of consumers who work and vote are allowed. Uncertainty plays an important role in that the government does not know the true realizations of the abilities of consumers drawn from a known distribution, but must meet the realization-dependent budget. Even though the space of alternatives is infinite dimensional, conditions on primitives are found to assure existence of a majority rule equilibrium when agents vote over both a public good and income taxes to finance it.
Keywords: Voting; Income taxation; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lma, nep-mic, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Working Paper: On the political economy of income taxation (2019)
Working Paper: On the Political Economy of Income Taxation (2018)
Working Paper: On Political Economy of Income Taxation (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:90488
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