Evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in bargaining

Abhimanyu Khan

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I study the evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individuals draw random samples of strategies used in the past and respond to it by using a behavioural rule. Even though individuals actually respond to historical demands, a necessary condition for stability is the existence of a state such that it is as-if the individuals are hardwired to make the same demand. Furthermore, the state where all individuals demand half of the pie is the unique neutrally stable state; all other states are unstable in the face of an invasion by a mutant behavioural rule.

Keywords: bargaining; evolution; stable behavioural rules; internal stability; external stability; equal split (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in bargaining (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:90811

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