Decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members
Mark Harris () and
Christopher Spencer ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We examine the dissent voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in its first decade. Probit estimates indicate the impact of career experience on dissent voting is negligible, whereas the impact of forecast inflation is pronounced. In addition to finding a role for dynamics, we also find a role for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of member-specific fixed-effects, suggesting previous literature characterizing voting behavior as largely determined by whether members are appointed from within or outside the ranks of Bank of England staff (internal and external members respectively) is overly simplistic.
Keywords: Bank of England; Monetary Policy Committee; career background effects; dissent voting; unobserved heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 E5 C35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cdm, nep-eec, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pol
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Journal Article: A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:9100
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