Political Reforms vs. Undemocratic Institutional Arrangements in Hong Kong

Cesare Scartozzi ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This essay examines the recent political developments in Hong Kong. Specifically, it examines the problem of political accountability and unresponsive governance. The essay argues that lack of accountability is a byproduct of existing institutional arrangements – i.e., limited functional franchise, veto powers and institutional backdoors – which promote rent-seeking behavior among tycoons and undermine the economic freedoms of ordinary Hongkongers, who, dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, demand political reforms.

Keywords: Hong Kong; institutional backdoors; accountability; unresponsive governance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N45 Y8 Y80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Published in Seoul National University Journal of International Affairs 1.2(2017): pp. 2-12

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:91325

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