Family firms and labour productivity: the role of enterprise-level bargaining in the Italian economy

Mirella Damiani, Fabrizio Pompei and Andrea Ricci

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate the role of Italian firms in labour productivity performance. We find that family-owned firms have lower labour productivity than their non-family counterparts. In a second step, we estimate the role of firm-level bargaining (FLB) to determine whether family-controlled firms that adopt this type of bargaining may partially close the gap in terms of labour productivity with their non-family competitors. Our results, obtained through IV estimation to control for endogeneity bias, suggest that enterprises under family governance achieve significant labour productivity gains — greater than those achieved by their non-family counterparts — when they adopt firm-level bargaining.

Keywords: Family firms; corporate governance; labour productivity; firm-level bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-eff and nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Journal of Small Business Management 4.56(2018): pp. 573-600

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91329/1/MPRA_paper_91329.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Family Firms and Labor Productivity: The Role of Enterprise‐Level Bargaining in the Italian Economy (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:91329

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().