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Measuring the External Stability of the One-to-One Matching Generated by the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model where the population expands with the arrival of a man and a woman. Individuals in this population are matched, before and after the expansion, according to a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) where men propose and women reject or (tentatively or permanently) accept. Using computer simulations of this model, we study how the percentage of matches disrupted (undisrupted) with the expansion of the population is affected when the initial size of the population and the size of correlation in the preferences of individuals change.

Keywords: One-to-one matching; deferred acceptance; stability; external stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-des and nep-gth
Date: 2019-01-15
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