The Success of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm under Heterogenous Preferences with Endogenous Aspirations
Ismail Saglam
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model with two phases; an adolescence phase where individuals meet a number of dates and learn about their aspirations, followed by a matching phase where individuals are matched according to a version of Gale and Shapley's (1962) deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using simulations of this model, we study how the likelihoods of matching and divorce, and also the balancedness and the speed of matching associated with the outcome of the DA algorithm are affected by the size of correlation in the preferences of individuals and by the frequency individuals update their aspirations in the adolescence phase.
Keywords: Mate search; one-to-one matching; stability; agent-based simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91475/1/MPRA_paper_91475.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The Success of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm Under Heterogenous Preferences with Endogenous Aspirations (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:91475
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().