Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. The two rules are in addition envy-free, but they differ on wether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (i) the constrained equal losses rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies justified envy-freeness on losses and (ii) the constrained equal awards rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies envy-freeness on awards.

Keywords: Division problem; Single-peaked preferences; Individual rationality; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Envy-freeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91721/1/MPRA_paper_91721.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97136/8/MPRA_paper_97136.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous (2021)
Working Paper: Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:91721

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().