Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total capacity for the two matching periods. Under the intern-optimal stable matching system, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. Common preferences for hospitals ensure the existence of equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies whereas unlike in games of capacity manipulation strong monotonicity of population is not a sufficient restriction on preferences to avoid the nonexistence problem. Besides, in games of capacity allocation, it is not true either that every hospital weakly prefers a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to any larger regular market quota profiles.

Keywords: Many-to-one matching; hospital-intern market; aftermarket; capacity allocation game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket (2009)
Working Paper: Games of Capacity Allocation in Many-to-One Matching with an Aftermarket (2008)
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