Allocating costs in set covering problems

Gustavo Bergantiños, María Gómez-Rúa, Natividad Llorca, Manuel Pulido and Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper deals with the problem of allocating costs in set covering situations. In particular, we focus on set covering situations where the optimal covering is given in advance. Thus, we take into account only the facilities that have to be opened and look for rules distributing their cost. We define a cooperative game and study the core and the nucleolus. We also introduce two new rules: the equal split rule on facilities and the serial rule. We axiomatically characterize the core, the nucleolus, and the two rules. Finally, we study several monotonicity properties of the rules.

Keywords: set covering problems; cost sharing rules; cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Allocating costs in set covering problems (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:92659

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