Nash Equilibrium in Tax and Public Investment Competition
Ajay Sharma and
Rupayan Pal ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We analyze Nash equilibrium in fiscal competition with tax and public investment between symmetric regions. We show that given the opposite strategic nature of tax (strategic complement) and public investment (strategic substitute), there is possibility of multiple equilibria. We find that if strategic substitute effect dominates strategic complement effect, then both regions have first mover advantage in a timing game and simultaneous move Nash equilibrium (early, early) emerges; otherwise sequential move equilibria-(early, late) and (late, early) emerges. Also, sequential move Nash equilibria are Pareto improving than simultaneous move outcome. Lastly, race-to-the-bottom in taxes is restricted in sequential move equilibria.
Keywords: Capital taxation; Public investment; Tax competition; Joint strategic substitutes; Joint strategic complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 H25 H41 H73 R5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-gth, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
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Journal Article: Nash equilibrium in tax and public investment competition (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:92827
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