Regulatory Spillovers in Common Audit Markets

Raphael Duguay, Michael Minnis and Andrew Sutherland

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We find that Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) had two significant effects on the audit market for nonpublic entities. The first short-run effect stems from inelastic labor supply coupled with an audit demand shock from public companies. As a result, private companies reduced their use of attested financial reports in bank financing by 12%, and audit fee increases for nonprofit organizations (NPOs) more than doubled. The second long-run effect was a transformation in the audit supply structure. After SOX, NPOs were less likely to match with auditors most exposed to public companies, while auditors increasingly specialized their offices based on client type. Audit market concentration for NPOs dropped by more than half within five years of SOX and remained at this level through the end of our sample in 2013, while the number of suppliers increased by 26%. Our results demonstrate how regulation directed at public companies generates economically im-portant spillovers for nonpublic entities.

Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley; securities regulation; auditing; market structure; accounting; private firms; non-profits; labor economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H83 M12 M2 M21 M41 M42 M48 M49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93669/1/MPRA_paper_93669.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Regulatory Spillovers in Common Audit Markets (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:93669

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().