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A Pareto Criterion on Systemic Risk

Weijia Wang

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Perfect risk sharing is not an optimal design for financial system because it can increase systemic risk by facilitating risk contagion among financial institutions. However, risk sharing dominates betting according to most Pareto efficiency criteria. One reason for this might be that those Pareto criteria consider individual risk rather than systemic risk and neglect that betting may reduce systemic risk by segmenting the financial system and preventing financial contagion. Refining Pareto criterion to cover systemic risk, I pro- pose the systemic Pareto criterion which has two features: 1) satisfying facts that betting dominates risk sharing when systemic risk is considered. 2) be- ing applicable to scenarios with constant endowment to which current criteria cannot provide compelling suggestions. One implication from this paper is that betting can act as the stabilizer of the economy and prohibiting betting is not always helpful for financial stability.

Keywords: Risk Sharing; Heterogenous Beliefs; Pareto Efficiency; Systemic Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc

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