Internal migration and public policy
Michele Giuranno () and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper studies the relation between internal migration and public spending on public goods. We describe centralized public policy when a central government is comprised of elected representatives from local electoral districts. Internal migration determines the median voter in the districts. The median voters decide the equilibrium policy through bargaining. We find the conditions under which voters' mobility results in larger or smaller public spending. Furthermore, the distance between the actual size and the efficient size of government spending depends on the way internal migration changes the distribution of income within and between districts.
Keywords: Demographic Changes; Government Spending; Inequality; Redistribution; Bargaining; Political Economy Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D31 D78 H00 H41 H50 R1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-29, Revised 2019-05-23
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Working Paper: Internal migration and public policy (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:94217
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