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The Institutional Dynamics of Colonial Exploitation

Simone D'Alessandro () and Tiziano Distefano

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper focuses on the interaction between the legacy of institutional arrangements and incentives on long-term development. We recalled two studies focusing on the long term effects of geographic discontinuities in colonial practice in India and Peru and we confronted the two historical cases as to emphasise the role of capital accumulation and equality of distribution. Furthermore, we propose an evolutionary game model to capture the evolutionary dynamics of institutional assets defining egalitarian or iniquitous income divisions in a non-cooperative setting. This framework sheds light on the role of the colonial governments in the interaction between local institutions and foreign colonial rule in terms of distribution, resources extraction, social asymmetries and finalised investments.

Keywords: Colonialism; Evolutionary Game Theory; Solow growth theory; inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F43 O1 P3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gro, nep-gth and nep-his
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