Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies
Christian Moser () and
Pedro Olea de Souza e Silva
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract We study optimal savings policies when there is a dual concern about undersaving for retirement and income inequality. Agents differ in present bias and earnings ability, both unobservable to a planner with paternalistic and redistributive motives. We characterize the solution to this two-dimensional screening problem and provide a decentralization using realistic policy instruments: mandatory savings at low incomes but a choice between subsidized savings vehicles at high incomes—resembling Social Security, 401(k), and IRA accounts in the US. Offering more savings choice at higher incomes facilitates redistribution. To solve large-scale versions of this problem numerically, we propose a general, computationally stable, and efficient active-set algorithm. Relative to the current US retirement system, we find significant welfare gains from increasing mandatory savings and limiting savings choice at low incomes.
Keywords: Optimal Taxation; Multidimensional Screening; Present Bias; Preference Heterogeneity; Paternalism; Retirement; Savings; Social Security; Active-Set Algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 E60 E62 H2 H20 H21 H23 H24 H5 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:95383
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