Influence model of evasive decision makers

Asma Khalid and Ismat Beg

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to introduce the notion of truthfulness in an influence based decision making model. An expert may submit his opinions truthfully or he may dismantle the original situation by undermining the actual opinion, such a decision maker is called an evasive decision maker or an almost truthful decision maker in this paper. It is assumed that experts in the panel are dignified members hence even though they are not habitual liars, they are either "almost truthful" or evasive. To measure their degree of truthfulness, we use the information provided by them in the form of preference relations. We use this information to state the foundation of influence model of evasive decision makers. Finally, a ranking method is proposed to find best possible solutions.

Keywords: Truthfulness; group decision making; social influence networks; additive reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C61 C63 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11-20, Revised 2019-06-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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