Parliamentary sovereignty and democratic accountability: matters of prerogative powers and legal reasoning

Marianne O D Delaney

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to the extant literature on the matter by highlighting how and why it is necessary to delineate between matters of public interests, national security – and ultimately the need to balance interests of democratic accountability and parliamentary (legislative) sovereignty from a background of the context, content and prevailing matters of public policy and constitutional relevance – even as intended by the rule of law and the application of separation of powers. Further, it highlights why the role of the judiciary becomes all the more important in ensuring that an appropriate balance and favorable consensus is reached between politically motivated goals and the need to uphold democratic accountability – particularly given the fact that the legislative and executive branches are more intricately linked – such that there are greater possibilities of conflicts of interest between these two branches.

Keywords: democratic accountability; rule of law; separation of powers; parliamentary sovereignty; Congress; parliament; Brexit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E4 E44 K2 K23 K49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-mac
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:96233

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