Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms

Mauricio Jara-Bertin and Félix López-Iturriaga ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mauricio Jara Bertin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms using a sample of firms from 11 European countries. We consider how the contest to the control of the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management in these firms. We find that increased contestability of the control of the largest shareholder reduces earnings management in family-owned firms. Our results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.

Keywords: corporate control; discretionary accruals; earnings management; family firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-eec and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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