Review of Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", with a reaction, also on its relevance in 2008 for the European Union

Thomas Colignatus ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: There will be many researchers who discover voting theory afresh and who will want to understand it and its interesting paradoxes. Arrow's theorem (1951, 1963) is the most celebrated result in social choice theory. It has been criticized a lot but Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", is a monograph that actually succeeds. The booklet has received insufficient attention in the literature. This review also compares DeLong’s approach with my own book "Voting theory for democracy" (2007) and comments on the relevance in 2008 for the European Union, with respect to the veto power of its Member States and their citizens.

Keywords: voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; Borda Fixed Point; democracy; European Union; Arrow's theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A2 D71 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07-21, Revised 2008-07-21
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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