A note on the impact of the internal organization on the accuracy of the information transmitted within the firm
Eduard Alonso-Pauli () and
Lluis Bru
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
We investigate the incentives sales managers have to transmit information on demand conditions to headquarters under different organizational structures, and its subsequent impact on firm performance. When headquarters chooses quantities, their interests are aligned and reliable information is transmitted. When the choice of quantities is delegated to the sales manager, instead, he prefers not to transmit reliable information and as a consequence, headquarters set transfer prices having poor information about demand. We then see that, due to this difference in the quality of the information available to headquarters, the centralized organization frequently has the best performance.
Keywords: Organizational structure; transfer pricing; information transmission; internal accounting system. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D81 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ore
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97118/1/MPRA_paper_97118.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97352/1/MPRA_paper_97118.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: A note on the impact of the internal organization on the accuracy of the information transmitted within the firm (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:97118
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