EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects

Gustavo Bergantiños and Leticia Lorenzo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A planner wants to carry out a project involving several firms. In many cases the planner, for instance the Spanish Administration, includes in the contract a penalty clause that imposes a payment per day if the firms do not complete their activities or the project on time. We discuss two ways of including such penalty clauses in contracts. In the first the penalty applies only when the whole project is delayed. In the second the penalty applies to each firm that incurs a delay even if the project is completed on time. We compare the two penalty systems and find that the optimal penalty (for the planner) is larger in the second method, the utility of the planner is always at least as large or larger in the second case and the utility of the firms is always at least as large or larger in the first. Surprisingly, the final delay in the project is unrelated to which penalty system is chosen.

Keywords: game theory; PERT; delays; penalties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in European Journal of Operational Research 275 (2019): pp. 608-620

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97139/5/MPRA_paper_97139.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:97139

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2023-11-11
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:97139