Economics at your fingertips  

Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication

Esra Eren Bayindir, Mehmet Gurdal, Ayca Ozdogan and Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first game, sequential in the second game and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed in similar settings with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. Despite similar theoretical predictions for these games, we observe systematic differences in experiments. In particular, while non-conflicting messages are observed less frequently under sequential communication due to the tendency of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender, the frequency of the second sender being truthful when the first sender lies is considerably higher in the Sequential Game in comparison to the truth-telling level in the Simultaneous Game. Moreover, in the Choice Game receiver prefers simultaneous mode of communication slightly more often than the sequential one. We explain the observed behavior of the players, estimating a logit quantal response equilibrium model and additionally running some logistic regressions. We find that the mode of communication is critical in design problems where a second opinion is available.

Keywords: Strategic information transmission; truth-telling; trust; sender-receiver game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication (2020) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

Page updated 2020-06-22
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:97152