House Allocation with Existing Tenants: Two Equivalence Results

Özgün Ekici

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: n houses (stand for indivisible objects) are to be allocated to n agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; k houses are initially unowned; k agents initially do not own houses; the remaining n-k agents (the so-called .existing tenants) initially own the remaining n-k houses (each owns one). In this setting, we consider various randomized allocation rules under which voluntary participation of existing tenants is assured and the randomization procedure either treats agents equally or discriminates against some (or all) of the existing tenants. We obtain two equivalence results, which generalize the equivalence results in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1998) and Sönmez and Ünver (2005).

Keywords: house allocation with existing tenants; house allocation; housing market; equivalence of mechanisms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011, Revised 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97368/1/MPRA_paper_97368.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:97368

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().